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USSC Report: Aftermath of the Wachtel Report
By Richard Crawford, USSC Legislative Consultant
Note: Due to space constraints, the “USSC Report” appearing in the June 2010 issue of Sign Builder Illustrated couldn’t be printed in full. The following is the complete, unabridged column .
One year after the publication of the Safety Impacts of the Emerging Digital Display Technology for Outdoor Advertising Signs report by Jerry Wachtel, a human factors researcher based in California, what's the outlook for sign companies seeking approvals for on-premise electronic message center (EMC) signs? While some sign companies have had tremendous success obtaining approvals for EMC signs, many more have had just as much difficulty— and some have been confronted with outright bans and moratoriums on their installation. The Wachtel Report unfortunately only serves to make matters worse, even though its theories are based on conjecture and opinion.
The USSC recently released a response to the so-called “Wachtel Report” titled Inside the Wachtel 2009 Digital Display Report: A Commonsense Guide. This new report provides an in-depth analysis and critique of the Wachtel Report and can be obtained for free at the USSC’s Web site (www.ussc.org).
Wachtel’s basic thesis is that EMC signs are dangerous and cause accidents because they’re distractions to the driver. To support this theory, he cobbles together information from separate and disconnected research (including some research not even on signs). He performs no new research and then ties everything together with a pretty bow.
Make no mistake: Sign companies will be confronted with the 2009 Wachtel Report, and they’ll be confronted by people claiming to know about its contents and speaking for it. And these folks will claim that the report “proves that EMC signs are a traffic hazard” and “demonstrates that research funded by the industry is flawed and biased.”
Mr. Wachtel goes out of his way to “de-bunk” significant EMC research conducted by leading universities and licensed professionals. Apparently for him, the source of research funding (industry) affects the objective data gathered and the methods used in the testing.
Here’s the bottom line on so-called “industry” research: There’s always room for healthy debate and even disagreement when research is conducted and experts later review and comment on that research in an academic sense. This is to be expected. But the 2009 Wachtel Report goes far beyond normal academic courtesies and labels industry work that doesn’t coincide with his theories as “biased” and “misleading.” The Wachtel Report’s own point-of-view couldn’t be made clearer.
In regard to proof, the Wachtel Report issues itself a pass on the whole idea of studying EMCs and attempting to “prove” his hypothesis—though this is a hypothesis that he encourages state and local regulatory agencies to adopt.
In a professional document, it’s surprising to see that requirement of proof so discounted. As a respected researcher, Mr. Wachtel posits these gems in his report:
“Nonetheless, it is difficult if not impossible to design and conduct a research study whose results can be applied with confidence to DBBs as a whole.”
“If crash causation is the standard that must be met, we may never get there.”
This is not necessarily because DBBs are not a causative factor in crashes; it is, as most researchers believe, more likely that our research methods are not sufficiently sensitive to identify this linkage.”
So, the reader is left to ponder these items:
1. Electronic message center signs have not been found to be a causative factor in crashes, based on numerous studies.
2. But researchers, despite this evidence, believe EMC signs cause accidents because:
A. The research methods aren’t “sensitive enough” to find the linkage;
B. The issue of EMCs and causation is complex and it’s hard to execute research properly;
C. Eighty percent of accidents aren’t reported to the police, so we must be missing some data somewhere;
D. Drivers in accidents won’t admit to having been distracted by an EMC (though they will admit to texting or eating a sandwich);
E. Driver’s eyes are drawn toward EMCs, even when the Driver doesn’t want to look; and finally (the coup de grace);
F. Drivers look at the EMCs and have crashes but they don’t know they’re looking at them and having crashes.
There’s a simpler explanation available here, of course: Electronic message centers don’t cause accidents or crashes, and the rest of this hand-wringing about them is being offered by an individual who just doesn’t like EMC signs.
Researchers have now commented, “…Wachtel believed that [it’s] neither feasible nor necessary to demonstrate a causal relationship between [EMCs] and road safety (or its reduction). Instead he thought that scientific understanding was already adequate for development of operational guidelines and ordinances.”
This assertion summarizes the 2009 Wachtel Report rationale: Nothing needs to be proven in a traditional, scientific, or (more importantly) legal sense; circumstantial evidence and theoretical declarations can suffice. In contrast, the objective documentation of findings is the foundation of scientific proof for an assertion. It’s hard to reconcile the two, which suggests that a disconnect exists between the 2009 NCHRP Wachtel Report and reality. |
